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They Were Shocked, Shocked

THE "DISCOVERY" OF ANALYST CONFLICTS ON
WALL STREET'

BarbaraMoses'
Once respected, and even celebrated, the sell-side equity
analysts who were such visible players in the bull market of
the 1990s have more recently faced criticism, investigation,
litigation, and in some cases disgrace. They have been pilloried
by pundits and plaintiffs for having routinely offered positive
opinions and overly aggressive buy recommendations while not
disclosing to the investing public their material conflicts of
interest. The mere existence of those conflicts strongly suggests
that the analysts' investment advice was less independent,
objective, and trustworthy than their employers hoped it would
be perceived. This conclusion has been reinforced by academic
studies
quantifying
the
bias
infecting
sell-side
recommendations and graphically illustrated by the discovery
of internal brokerage firm emails in which some analysts
privately disparaged (or sold) the same stocks they were
publicly praising. Many argue that tainted advice from
conflicted analysts played an important role in the expansion of
the so-called Internet bubble.'

© 2004 Barbara Moses. All Rights Reserved.
Barbara Moses is a principal at Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason &
Silberberg, P.C. in New York City. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Betsy Turner, Thomas Keane and Oren Goldberg in preparing this article.
1 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F.
Supp. 2d 351, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting plaintiffs' brief, which stated, '[slome, and
perhaps much, of the 'Internet bubble' was a classic stock market manipulation
engineered by Wall Street's investment bankers and research analysts"); cf. Robert P.
Sieland, Note, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory Hoopla, Securities Analysts
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This article accepts, in large part, the premises
underlying much of the current criticism of sell-side analysts
and their conduct during the 1990s: that the analysts were, in
fact, operating within a system that subjected them to
pervasive pressure to recommend stocks based on the needs of
the investment banking divisions of the brokerage firms that
employed them instead of the best interests of retail investors.
Consequently, many analysts (though by no means all) issued
overly-optimistic research reports pushing stocks that they
privately doubted or even derided. Nonetheless, the flurry of
editorializing, rulemaking, enforcement activity and civil
litigation that began in 2001 and went into high gear in 2002 all in response to what by then was called the analyst conflict
"scandal" - reminds this cynical observer a bit of the classic
scene in Casablanca'where Captain Renault, standing in front
of the roulette wheels he has played for years, solemnly
announces: "I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is
going on in here."
No securities regulator should have been shocked to
discover that sell-side equity analysts were joined at the hip to
their investment banking colleagues and that the objectivity of
their research suffered as a result. To the contrary: throughout
the last decade, the pressures placed on analysts to favor the
interests of investment bankers over the interests of investors
were discussed frankly in the nation's financial press.
Moreover, the fact that these pressures compromised the
objectivity of the research product was well understood by
sophisticated market participants.' Indeed, in the late 1990s well before Eliot Spitzer made headlines with his investigation
of Merrill Lynch' - at least two separate academic studies
found that the recommendations issued by analysts working for
firms with investment banking ties to the companies they
covered were more positive, but less accurate, than the
recommendations issued by their non-compromised colleagues.'
also shows that the
The empirical
evidence
recommendations published by underwriter-affiliated analysts
had less of an impact on market prices than recommendations
Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 531, 542 (2003) ("Analysts, of
course, were not solely responsible for the Internet bubble.").
2 Warner Bros.
1942.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 16-39.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 20-25.
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authored by more independent analysts, meaning that the
market discounted research likely to be biased.' This in turn
suggests that such research had less to do with the Internet
bubble - and that the discovery of the bias had less to do with
the bubble's collapse - than the current crop of class action
plaintiffs and their lawyers would like to believe.
It is undoubtedly true that many unsophisticated retail
investors were unaware of the structural and institutional
pressures on sell-side analysts, and may have relied on
unsound recommendations in purchasing securities that they
otherwise would have eschewed. However, the fact that "the
market" understood the weaknesses inherent in such
recommendations has proven to be a significant hurdle for
many of the high-dollar class actions based on analyst conflict
allegations. Some have been dismissed on statute of limitation
grounds,7 and some have failed due to an inability to plead loss
causation And while many other cases have survived these
challenges at the pleading stage, plaintiffs can expect
increasing resistance at the class certification and summary
judgment stages, where allegations must be supported by
admissible evidence. In fact, as a precondition to applying the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine in analyst conflict cases, the
Second Circuit recently signaled that it may require a trial
court to conduct a rigorous analysis, at the class certification
stage, of the evidence supporting the alleged causal link
between an analyst's reports and movements in the price of the
company's stock.' Such a ruling could make class certification
motions far more challenging for the plaintiffs in analystconflict cases than in most other securities fraud class actions. °
The first half of this article traces the history of what is
now called the analyst conflict scandal, demonstrating that the
basic facts "discovered" by Eliot Spitzer, by other regulators,
and ultimately by the plaintiffs' bar after the collapse of the
Internet bubble were actually well known to sophisticated
market participants throughout the 1990s. As a consequence,
the research issued by potentially-biased analysts was
routinely discounted by the market, blunting the impact of that
research on prices. The second half of this article shows that
6 See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.

See infra text accompanying notes 93-116.
Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2004).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 118-25.
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the three legal issues that have thus far proved the most
challenging for plaintiffs in analyst-conflict class actions - the
statute of limitations, loss causation, and the applicability of
the fraud-on-the market doctrine - all have their roots in these
same historical facts. Many Wall Street observers, including
the author of this article, believe that even if most of the
current class actions survive these challenges at the pleading
stage, they are likely to founder on the same issues at class
certification, summary judgment, or trial.
THE ROLE OF RESEARCH ANALYSTS
Research analysts study companies that issue securities
and "draw on a wealth of industry, economic, and business
trend information to help their clients make better investment
decisions."" Based on their review of financial and other
information, they make recommendations regarding the
purchase, retention and/or sale of securities issued by
particular companies or industry groups." Some analysts are
employed directly by the institutional investors whose
decisions they help guide (such as mutual funds, hedge funds
and pension plans) and make their recommendations available
only to their employers. Others are employed by independent
firms whose primary business is selling research to their
paying clients. "Sell-side" analysts, by way of contrast, are
typically employed by full-service brokerage firms. These
brokerage firms historically provided research as a free or
nominal-cost service to their retail clients while making money
from other activities, such as commissions charged to those
retail clients, proprietary trading, and - most relevant here investment banking.
Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that
the work analysts do is "necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market," as they "ferret out and analyze information" 3
that, upon reaching the market, "redounds to the benefit of all
investors." 4 This paradigm, however, assumes that the
ANALYST
SECURITIES
TO
UNDERSTANDING
GUIDE
NASD,
" See
RECOMMENDATIONS [hereinafter NASD GUIDE], at http://www.nasdr.com/analystbrochure.htm (last visited July 22, 2004).
12 See SEC, INVESTOR ALERT: ANALYZING ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS, at

http'//www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last modified June 20, 2002).
" Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
14 Id. at 659 n.17. (quoting In re Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket
1401, 1406, 1981 WL
36329, at *6 (S.E.C. Release No. 34-17480)).
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analysts' work is honest (if not perfect), or at least that any
idiosyncratic individual biases are balanced by the
countervailing biases held by others. In the case of sell-side
analysts working in the 1990s, these assumptions are now
widely believed to be faulty.
THE CONFLICTS FACED BY ANALYSTS

Simply put, full-service brokerage firms have a financial
interest in the recommendations made by their analysts." In
testimony on Capital Hill in mid-2001 - when the drum-beat
for regulatory reform was gathering momentum - the Acting
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Commission or SEC), Laura Unger, explained that positive
recommendations in general tend to be good for the firm's
bottom line, as they can "trigger higher trading volumes,
resulting in greater commissions for the firms. " "
Positive coverage of companies for which the firm acts
(or hopes to act) as underwriter can be even more important to
its overall profitability. This was especially true during the
bull market of the 1990s, when companies were eager to issue
securities to the public, their investment banking divisions
were eager to secure that lucrative business, and both sides
considered positive research coverage by the firm's analysts to
be part of its investment banking services. 8 Indeed, a survey
conducted by the SEC in 2001 found that most full-service
firms, rather than acting to protect their research analysts
from investment banking pressure, exacerbated the problem
by, among other things: using analysts to woo issuers as part of
the investment banking team; sending analysts on "road
shows" to pre-sell the new issue; paying analysts based on the
'5 NASD GUIDE, supra note 11.

16 See Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms

and Their Research Analysts: Before the Subomm. On Capital Mkts., Ins. And Gov't
Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (July 31, 2001)

(statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Unger Statement],
available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
17 Id.; see also Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Prepared Statement Concerning
Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies, Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong.
(March 5, 2002) [hereinafter Coffee Statement], available at http://banking.senate.gov/
02_03hrg/030502coffee.htm.
,8 See, e.g., Randall Smith & Suzanne Craig, Heard on the Street: Will
Grubman Case Tone Down the Exaggeration by Analysts?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002,

at C1 ("During the 1980s and 1990s, analysts often served as quasiadvocates for the
companies that hired their firms for investment-banking work.").
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profitability of the firm's investment banking division or giving
investment bankers input into their bonuses; and offering
analysts opportunities to invest, either directly or through
pools, in the stock of the same companies they were then
assigned to cover. 9
Not surprisingly, given these inherent structural
overwhelmingly
positive
pressures,
analysts
issued
recommendations during the late 1990s."° This phenomenon
may have been partly due to the herd mentality resulting from
a long bull market and the glittering promise of the Internet.
Indeed, Henry Blodget, the Merrill Lynch analyst who became
a star in January 1999 by correctly predicting that
Amazon.com would hit $400 per share,2 recently disclosed that
he lost much of his own money when the Internet bubble burst
the following year. The reason, according to Blodget: "in
a moron.""
Elaborating on this
hindsight, I was
pronouncement, Blodget explained that his decision-making
was fueled in part by "years of mind-boggling stock
performance" and the conviction that "the risk of not being
invested in the Internet approached the risk of being invested
in it. " '
The we-were-all-suckers theory, however, only goes so
far. It fails to explain the now-familiar incidents, uncovered by
both federal and state regulators, of sell-side analysts privately
deriding, selling,
or even
shorting securities while
recommending the same stock to the investing public.' It was
this evidence, perhaps more than anything else, that seemed to
19 Unger Statement, supra note 16, at 4-6.
20 See Coffee Statement, supra note 17; see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Virtue

and the Securities Analyst, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 2001, at 6 n.1 (29% of recommendations
during the period studied were "strong buys," 37% were "buys," and 31% recommended
a "hold." Only 1% were 'sell" recommendations and 0.4% were "strong sells.").
21 See David Streitfield, Analyst with a Knack for
Shaking Up Net Stocks:
Henry Blodget Is Wall Street's Link Between Online Firms, Investors, WASH. POST, Apr.
2, 2000, at H1.
22 Henry Blodget, The Wall Street Self-Defense Manual,
Part I, Slate sidebar,
at http://www.slate.com/id/2103952/sidebar/2103956 (last visited July 22, 2004).
23 Id.
On April 28, 2002, Blodget was barred from the securities industry for
life. See infra note 67.
24 See Unger Statement, supra note 16, at 6
& n.8 (SEC examiners found
three instances where analysts executed trades in their personal accounts contrary to
,their published recommendations); Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo, In re Eliot Spitzer, No.
02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April 8, 2002), at 13 [hereinafter Dinallo Affidavit] (listing
examples, drawn from internal Merrill Lynch emails, of analysts privately disparaging
stocks that they were publicly recommending), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (last visited July 27, 2004).
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convince the press, the regulators, and the public that Wall
Street had an analyst conflict problem. 5
HIDDEN IN PLAIN VIEW

The practices that Acting Chairman Unger disclosed to
the Capital Markets Subcommittee in July 2001 were all well
known to market professionals, and had been for many years
before the Subcommittee convened its hearings." Nor were they
kept secret from the public. As early as 1988, the Harvard
Business School Press published a well-received book-length
guide to the investment banking business, explaining why
firms seeking to strengthen their relationships with issuers
paid analysts "deal-based bonuses."27
Investors were not required to pore through academic
texts, however, to learn about the relationship between
investment bankers and sell-side analysts. The key information
was all in the news pages of the Wall Street Journal and other
general-interest publications. In 1992, for example, the Journal
reported that a prominent brokerage firm had a stated policy
against making "negative or controversial comments about
[their] [investment banking] clients." 2' Four years later, the
same paper reported the preliminary results of a study
conducted by two economists, noting the widespread practice of
paying analysts "in part, according to their contribution to
corporate finance."29 The article stated its conclusion in plain
and simple terms: "The recommendations by underwriter
analysts show significant evidence of bias and possible conflict
0
of interest.""
25 See supra text

accompanying notes 16 & 24.
Sieland, supra note 1, at 531 ("Wall Street has been aware of the
symbiotic relationship between investment bankers and analysts for years.").
26 See

27 ROBERT G. ECCLES & DWIGHT B. CRANE, DOING DEALS: INVESTMENT BANKS

AT WORK 173-75 (1988).

28 Michael Siconolfi, At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to Soften Harsh
Views, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at Al.

Roger Lowenstein, Today's Analyst Often Wears Two Hats, WALL ST. J.,

May 2, 1996, at C1.
Id. See also Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting
Relationships, Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 25 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 101 (1998) (finding that recommendations by brokerage firms that
served as lead or co-lead underwriters for the covered companies' stock offerings were
significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts); Steve Bailey &
Steven Syre, Taking Analysts' Tempting Forecasts with a Grain of Salt, BOSTON

GLOBE, Oct. 23, 1996, at C1 (reporting similar conclusions in yet another study were
scholars at the Wharton School and the Harvard Business School: "[Alnalysts are
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In 1997, yet another Wall Street Journal article
explained that "at many firms, analysts are expected to bring
in investment-banking deals" and then continue to keep those
clients happy:
By the unwritten laws of Wall Street, brokerage houses don't handle
a stock offering unless they expect to tout its stock for a while after
the offering. In Wall Street parlance, a post-offering recommendation
is commonly called a "booster shot."
Another important job of the analyst, at most firms, is to generate
trading volume by getting clients excited about the recommended
stocks.... They have to work the phones, meet the clients, "pound
the table" for the stocks they believe in. A great recommendation
that nobody buys doesn't help the clients and doesn't make the
brokerage firm any money."

And in 1998, the Journal matter-of-factly reported that
68% of the analyst recommendations tallied by a tracking firm
were "strong buys" or "buys" and 31% were "holds," while less
than 1% of the 2,066 ratings studied were "sells" of any shade.'
A few months later, a cover article in Business Week
recited similar statistics and forcefully warned its readers
about sell-side analysts' not-so-hidden agenda:
The question for investors is: "Can you trust your analyst?"
Unfortunately, the answer is not very much. At the major Wall
Street houses, which thrive on investment banking, every analyst
has a potential conflict of interest. The "Chinese Wall" that on paper
still separates a firm's analysts from its investment bankers
continues to crumble as analysts are encouraged to scout deals. The
analyst's firm is either the investment banker for a company he or
she is covering - or it's wooing the company for a piece of that juicy
revenue stream. 3

Business Week went on to report that analysts whose
firms had investment-banking ties with the companies they
covered issued higher earnings forecasts and even more "buy"

systematically overly optimistic about long-term earnings forecasts for equity
offerings," and "the cause is the relationship between the analysts and the investment
banking business that pays their bills.").
3' John R. Dorfman, All-Star Analysts 1997 Survey: Sixteen All-Stars Excel
for Fifth Time, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1997, at R1.
32 John Hechinger, Heard in New England:Analysts May Hate to Say 'Sell,'
But a Few Companies Do Hear It, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at NE2.
33 Jeffrey M. Laderman, Who Can You Trust? Wall Street's Spin Game, Bus.
WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 150.
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recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. It also explained
the multiple pressures that led to those statistics."
In 1999 and early 2000, the financial press continued to
lay out for the public, in a fair amount of detail, just how
research
analysts
had
become."
Some
compromised
publications also reported that the Chairman of the SEC,
Arthur Levitt, had begun to muse publicly about the pressures
analysts were under to attract and retain investment banking
business." And the economists whose work was first reported
in 1996 published their finished study, concluding that
"recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant
evidence of bias." 37 They also showed that, although the market
tended to respond with a short-term price increase after a
positive recommendation from an analyst affiliated with the
issuer's underwriter, the increase was lower than that
following a similar recommendation from an unaffiliated
analyst." From this data the authors concluded that the
market recognized and discounted biased recommendations
from underwriter-affiliated analysts, but did not recognize "the
full extent of this bias.""
Despite the abundant evidence that something was
seriously amiss in the world of equity analysts, there was little
or no effort to fix it so long as the market continued to rise. No
Congressional hearings were held; no significant rulemaking
was initiated by the Commission or the self-regulatory
organizations;0 and no major enforcement actions or private
lawsuits were brought to punish miscreants or compensate
34 Id.

35 See, e.g., Jon Birger, New Executive: Henry Blodget; Merrill Lynch's Top
Pick: Internet Analyst Lured from CIBC; On-Target Research Should Attract IPOs,
CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 22, 1999, at 11; John Cassidy, The Woman in the Bubble: How
Mary Meeker Helps Internet EntrepreneursBecome Very, Very Rich, NEW YORKER, Apr.,
26, 1999, at 48; Erick Schonfeld, The High Price of Research; Caveat Investor: Stock
and Research Analysts Covering Dot-Coms Aren't as Independent as You Think,
FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 118 [hereinafter Caveat Investor]; Stephen Barr, What
Chinese Wall?, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 2000.
36 See, e.g., Frog Spawn, ECONOMIST, Apr.
17, 1999, at 79.
17 Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest
and the Credibility
of UnderwriterAnalyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (1999).
38 Id.
at 671-73, 677-78.
39 Id. at 653.
40 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2004), which became
effective in October
2002, requires issuers to make full disclosure of material, nonpublic information to the
public as a whole at the same time it is disclosed to any analyst. This regulation was
intended to limit the ability of companies to play favorites with analysts, but did not
address the fundamental conflict issues outlined above.
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their victims. To the contrary: Henry Blodget was paid over $5
million in 1999.1 Meanwhile, Morgan Stanley raised the pay
package of its most prominent Internet analyst, Mary Meeker,
from $6 million to $15 million, ' and Salomon Smith Barney's
telecommunications analyst Jack Grubman, who received a $15
million bonus when he joined the firm in 1998, was said to earn
$20 million annually thereafter.'
THE MARKET SOURS; ANALYSTS COME UNDER FIRE

The most likely explanation for the lack of any serious
Congressional, regulatory or enforcement interest in analyst
conflicts throughout the 1990s is also the simplest: "A runaway
bull market glosses over a multitude of analysts' sins."" That
bull market ended on March 24, 2000, when the NASDAQ
composite index briefly rose above 5000 and closed at an alltime record high of 4963. By June 2000, the NASDAQ had
dropped 1000 points, only to lose another 2000 points by June
2001, and hit its lowest close of this century, at 1114, on
October 9, 2002.
While the NASDAQ dropped, the percentage of "buy"
recommendations issued by sell-side analysts did not. In fact,
TheStreet.com reported in a much-forwarded article in March
2001 that the percentage of "buy" and "hold" recommendations
had actually increased over the past ten months while the
number of "sell" calls "held steady in the zero percent range.""
While there could be good reasons for an objective analyst to
remain (or become) bullish on a stock as its price drops, the
overall picture painted by the industry-wide statistics was not
attractive. As TheStreet.com put it, tongue in cheek:4 "Investors
shouldn't have sold anything since last May. Really."
That same day, the Wall Street Journal and other
publications mentioned a novel legal theory put forward by an
1

41

See Charles Gasparino, Merrill is Paying in Wake ofAnalyst's Call on Tech

Stock, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2001, at C1 [hereinafter Merrill Settles].
42 See Peter Elkind, Where Mary Meeker Went Wrong, FORTUNE,
April 30,
2001, at 68.

See Charles Gasparino, Salomon's Grubman Resigns: NASD Finds
'Spinning'at Firm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2002, at Al.
Laderman, supra note 33, at 148.
45 Dan

Bernstein, The Analysts Report: In Search of the Elusive Sell Call,

THESTREET.COM (Mar. 2, 2001), at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/analystreport/
1327554.html (last visited October 11, 2004).
46

- .
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investor who had filed an arbitration claim against Merrill
Lynch. Debases Kanjilal, a pediatrician, claimed that he had
lost over $500,000 (later reports put the loss at over $1 million)
investing money he was saving for his children's college tuition
in an Internet start-up called InfoSpace based on the positive
recommendation of Merrill's star analyst Blodget. 7 According
to Kanjilal, Blodget violated SEC Rule 10b-54 when he issued
his InfoSpace recommendations because they "lacked a
reasonable basis in fact" and failed to disclose "a serious
conflict of interest" - namely, that Merrill was advising
another Internet company, Go2Net, that was acquired by
InfoSpace.4 Had InfoSpace's stock price fallen, Kanjilal alleged,
it would have jeopardized the acquisition and hence Merrill's
fee.'
A few months later, in July 2001, Merrill and Blodget
settled the Kanjilal arbitration for $400,000 - a small sum, but
a significant concession in the eyes of many commentators. "
Professor Coffee likened the settlement to "putting out warm
milk for a stray cat that meows. You get 30 more cats the next
night.""
ENTER SPITZER

Merrill told the public that it settled the Kanjilal case
"to avoid the expense and distraction of protracted litigation."'
What it may not have realized at the time was that it would
later face considerably more expense and distraction in the

" Charles Gasparino, All-Star Analyst Faces Arbitration After Internet Pick
Hits the Skids, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C18 [hereinafter All-Star Analyst].
48

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).

All-Star Analyst, supra note 47.
50 Id.
51 Merrill Settles, supra note 41. See also Carol Vinzant, Merrill to Pay
Investor $400,000 in Settlement, WASH. POST, July 21, 2001, at El ("[Pilaintifi's
4

lawyers believe the case will pave the way for other investors to claim they're owed
money because analysts maintained 'buy' recommendations on sinking stocks."); Andy
Kessler, Manager'sJournal:We're All Analysts Now, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at A18

("Now every Tom, Dick and Fidelity will want similar reparations from the Internet
wars.").

. GEORGE J. SIEGEL, USING THE LAW FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 8 (2002)

(footnote

omitted),

available at

http://media.wiley.com/product-data/excerpt/36/

07879562/0787956236.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
Merrill Settles, supra note 41.
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form of an investigation by the Attorney General of New York,
Eliot Spitzer, under the Martin Act.'
On April 8, 2002, after investigating for approximately
ten months and reviewing thousands of internal firm emails,
Spitzer's office commenced a Martin Act proceeding against
Merrill Lynch, Blodget, and seven other Merrill employees. The
action was based primarily on an affidavit by Assistant
Attorney General Eric R. Dinallo." The Dinallo Affidavit
explained the ways in which pressure from the Merrill Lynch
investment banking group compromised the objectivity of the
firm's analysts. In addition, the Dinallo Affidavit described and
quoted from numerous emails (none of them intended for public
consumption and some of them rather crude) in which Merrill
analysts aired distinctly uncomplimentary views about the
stocks that they were rating "buy" or "accumulate."56 In some
cases, according to the Attorney General, analysts shared these
unvarnished opinions with selected institutional investors but withheld them from the firm's retail customers and the
public. 7 And at no time, Spitzer charged, did Merrill explain to
the public that its 5-point rating scale (where a "1" was "buy"
and a "5" was "sell") existed only on paper. In practice, the
Internet group, which covered dot-coms and other hightechnology, Internet-dependent companies, "never rated a stock
4 or 5."'
Thanks to the Dinallo Affidavit, the Attorney General's
office obtained an ex parte order on April 8, 2002 enjoining
Merrill Lynch, during the pendency of the Martin Act inquiry,
from issuing any equity research reports without making a
The Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352 et seq. (McKinney 1996), is New
York's securities statute, and like other such statutes it prohibits fraud in connection
with the sale of securities. Id. §§ 352(1), 352-c. But in other respects the Martin Act is
quite different from other blue sky laws, particularly with respect to the power granted
to the Attorney General. For example, under the Martin Act - unlike comparable
statutes in other states - the Attorney General may commence an action by obtaining,
from any supreme (trial) court justice in the state, an ex parte order directing the
respondents to appear and produce documents and testimony. Moreover, the statute
specifies that the requested order "shall" be granted, "with such preliminary injunction
or stay as may appear to such justice to be proper and expedient." Id. § 354.
55 Dinallo Affidavit, supra note
24.
Id., at 10-13. One of the stocks publicly touted but privately trashed was
InfoSpace, which Blodget called a "piece of junk" in October 2000. Id. at 12.
" Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 9. In addition to rating stocks "1," "2"or "3," Merrill Lynch assigned
each stock it covered an "investment risk" ranging from "A" (least risky) to "D" (most
risky). Id. All of the stocks discussed in the Dinallo Affidavit - including InfoSpace were assigned a "D" rating. Id.
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number of court-ordered disclosures. Among other things
Merrill Lynch was required to disclose: (i) any investment
banking relationship between the firm and the issuer for the
past three years; (ii) whether the firm was currently
attempting or had attempted to form an investment banking
relationship with the issuer; and (iii) the aggregate
distribution, on a percentage basis, of the various rating
categories for all stocks in the applicable sector by the firm that is, the grading curve."
As was his practice, Spitzer held a press conference and
issued a release to announce the initiation of the Martin Act
proceeding, noting that he had already sent subpoenas to other
Wall Street firms looking for similarly explosive material.'
According to the press release, Merrill Lynch's activity "was a
shocking betrayal of trust by one of Wall Street's most trusted
names." The Attorney General went on to state, "the case must
be a catalyst for reform throughout the entire industry."1
And it was. In the space of six weeks, Spitzer reached a
settlement with Merrill Lynch and its personnel. As part of the
agreement, the firm agreed to continue making detailed
disclosures concerning its investment banking ties with the
companies its analysts covered." Merrill also agreed to set up a
Research Recommendation Committee to monitor the work of
its analysts and ensure their objectivity, to put an end to all
input, direct or indirect, that the investment banking
department had into compensation determinations for
analysts, and to pay a $100 million civil penalty, with $48
million of that going to New York and the rest split among the
other states and the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA).'

56 Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In re Spitzer, No.

02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/
apr08b_02_attach.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
60 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of
Interest, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b 02.html (Apr. 8, 2002).
61 Id.
62 See Press Release, Office of New York
State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment
Practices, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may2la02.html (May 21,
2002).
Id. See also Agreement between the Attorney General of the State of New
York and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
investors/merrill-agreement.pdf (May 21, 2002).
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JOINT INVESTIGATION AND GLOBAL SETTLEMENT

Not to be outdone, on April 25, 2002 the SEC, the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASAA announced that they
were conducting a joint investigation with Spitzer into research
analysts and their potential conflicts of interest. The SEC's
news release quoted Chairman Pitt as stating that this
investigation was the "next step

. . .

in the Commission's year-

long review of analyst practices."' However, the Chairman
gave credit to Eliot Spitzer, acknowledging that "[t]he recent
disclosures that resulted from the investigation by the New
York State Attorney General ... reinforced the Commission's

conclusion that further inquiry is warranted."'
The joint investigation produced what is now known as
the "Global Settlement" among the regulators, ten Wall Street
firms (including Merrill Lynch), and two individuals (Blodget
and Grubman).6 The Global Settlement was announced in
principle on December 20, 2002,"7 finalized on April 28, 2003,"
and approved by a United States District Judge on October 31,
2003.9 Under the Global Settlement, the settling firms agreed
to pay a total of approximately $1.4 billion: $875 million in
penalties and disgorgement (that figure includes Merrill
Lynch's previous payment of $100 million in connection with
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst
Conflicts, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56.htm (Apr. 25, 2002).
65 id.
The other firms were Bear Stearns, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Piper
Jaffray, UBS, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup Global Markets (f/k/a Salomon Smith
Barney), Credit Suisse First Boston and Morgan Stanley. See Joint Press Release,
SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving
Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking [hereinafter Top
Investment Firms], at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (Apr. 28, 2003).
67 See Press Release, SEC, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA,
NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment
Practices, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (Dec. 20, 2002).
68 See Top Investment Firms, supra note 66. That same day, the SEC
announced that Grubman and Blodget were barred from the securities industry for life
and would pay fines of $15 million and $4 million, respectively. See Joint Press
Release, SEC, The Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and the New York
Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Henry Blodget From the Securities Industry and
Require $4 Million Payment, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-56.htm (Apr. 28,
2003); Joint Press Release, SEC, The Securities and Exchange Commission, New York
Attorney General's Office, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar
Jack Grubman and Require $15 Million Payment, at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2003-55.htm (Apr. 28, 2003).
69 See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2937, 2003 WL 22466156
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003).
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the Spitzer settlement), $433 million to fund independent
research, and $80 million to fund and promote investor
education." Approximately half of the new penalty money ($399
million by the time judgment was entered in October 2003) is
earmarked for restitution to customers of the settling firms
injured as a result of their research misconduct.71
In addition to the monetary assessments, the Global
Settlement requires the brokerage firms to insulate their
research analysts from investment banking pressure by: (i)
physically separating the departments; (ii) requiring senior
management to determine the research budget without input
from investment banking; (iii) prohibiting any investment
banking role in evaluating analysts or determining their
compensation; (iv) requiring the managers of the research
group alone to make all decisions to initiate or terminate
company-specific coverage; and (v) keeping analysts out of
"beauty contests" and roadshows.72 In addition, the firms
agreed to purchase independent research from at least three
outside firms, to furnish that research to its customers for the
next five years, and to make its own analysts' historical ratings
and price forecasts publicly available in order to enable
investors to compare analyst performance throughout the
industry.73
While some commentators believe that the reforms
implemented by means of the Global Settlement and recent
rulemaking do not go far enough,7 ' Attorney General Spitzer
has repeatedly declared his optimism (if not wholesale
confidence) that "analytical work will be better, investment
75
decisions will be sounder, investors won't be led astray."
MAKE THAT 150 CATS
Although the Global Settlement includes an investor
restitution mechanism, it does not bar private civil lawsuits by
70

See Top Investment Firms, supra note 66.
WL 22466156, at *2. See also Top Investment Firms, supra note

71 SEC, 2003

66.
72

See Top Investment Firms, supra note 66.

73 Id.

74 See, e.g., Sieland, supra note 1, at 569 (arguing that the SEC should

require brokerage firms to characterize their research reports as "sales literature" and
confer the label of "independent analyst" on those who meet certain criteria).
75 See Interview by Hedrick Smith with Eliot Spitzer, at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/interviews/spitzer.html (Apr. 16, 2003).
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customers who believe they were injured by the misconduct of
compromised sell-side analysts or their employers. To the
contrary: Spitzer expected that the Dinallo Affidavit and other
materials made public as a result of the investigation and
settlement would be utilized by the private bar on behalf of
customers seeking damages."6
His expectations have been fully met. By November
2002, over 150 securities fraud class actions were pending
against Merrill Lynch alone, based primarily on analyst
conflict allegations." Most of them followed on the heels of
Spitzer's Martin Act investigation and rely heavily on the
Dinallo Affidavit. A few cases, however, were filed as early as
the summer of 2001, after the Kanjilal settlement was
8 Other
announced."
large Wall Street firms have also attracted
multiple cases. Many of them were filed after the Global
Settlement was announced in April 2003, at which point the
SEC publicly released the internal emails and other evidence
that it had gathered from the settling firms."9
EARLY RESULTS ARE MIXED

Actionable Misrepresentations
Typically, the analyst-conflict class actions are brought
under SEC Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security.' The plaintiffs claim
76

See id. ("We have made public the information that they need to bring a

lawsuit.").

71 See MERRILL LYNCH & CO., QUARTERLY REPORT [FORM 10-Q] 46,
available

at http://ir.ml.com/EdgarDetail.cfm?CompanyID=MER&CIK=65100&FID=6510002-22
&SID=02-00 (Nov. 8, 2002). Many of the Merrill Lynch cases were later consolidated by
issuer, leaving approximately 30 consolidated complaints to be litigated before Senior
District Judge Milton Pollack in the Southern District of New York. See MERRILL
LYNCH & Co., ANNUAL REPORT [FORM 10-K]

32 (March 9, 2004), available at

http://ir.ml.com/EdgarDetail.cfm?CompanylD=MER&CIK=65100&FID=950123-04-303
O&SID=04-00 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). Judge Pollack died, at age 97, on August 13,
2004. See New York Judge Dies, N.Y. LAWYER, Aug. 17, 2004, at 1.
78 See, e.g., Pludo v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
& Co., No. 01 Civ. 7072,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,541 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). These figures do not include the
numerous individual arbitration claims filed by customers alleging analyst-related
injuries.
7! See, e.g., DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F. Supp. 2d 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (noting that the case was filed shortly after the SEC released emails showing
that a Lehman analyst advised an institutional investor to short RealNetworks while
maintaining a "buy" recommendation on the stock).
80 Cf. Norman v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,844, 2004 WL 1287310 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the case was brought principally on
breach of fiduciary duty theory by customers of Salomon Smith Barney who held
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that the defendants' research reports were materially false or
misleading in that: (i) they made recommendations that were
inconsistent with the analysts' true opinions; (ii) they lacked
any reasonable factual basis or ignored contrary facts; (iii) they
failed to disclose the inherent conflicts built into the
relationship between the research and the investment banking
departments; (iv) they failed to disclose the specific conflicts
stemming from the brokerage firm's relationship with the
covered company; (v) they failed to disclose the truth
concerning the "grading curve," that is, the high proportion of
the firm's recommendations that were "buys" or the equivalent;
or (vi) all of the above.81
Notwithstanding the protected position that statements
of opinion generally occupy under the federal securities laws,"
defendants have for the most part been unsuccessful in moving
to dismiss the claims against them for failure to plead
actionable misrepresentations. This is because, under Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,' a statement of opinion that is
contrary to the speaker's actual subjective view is treated as a
false statement of fact. Most of the class action complaints
based on analyst conflicts expressly allege that the research
reports in question did not accurately reflect the views of the
analysts who wrote them, and consequently are not challenged
on the ground that the reports contain protected statements of
opinion rather than actionable statements of fact. The
complaints that have been challenged on this ground have
generally survived the motion to dismissM Some complaints,
'guided

portfolio management" accounts guided by recommendations of Salomon
research analysts).
81 See, e.g., Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9192,835,
2004 WL 1151542, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports
Sec. Lit., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
82 Under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the
defendant made "any untrue statement of a material fact" or omitted to state "a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made... not misleading." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2004) (emphasis added). Moreover, under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"), a "forward looking" statement
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language is entitled to a statutory "safe harbor"
protecting its speaker from liability so long as the statements were not made with
actual knowledge of their falsity. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000).
501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991).
See, e.g., Fogarazzo, 2004 WL 1151542; DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F.
Supp. 2d at 634-35; DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
92,689, 318 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 392, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Plaintiffs "have alleged with particularity sufficient
facts showing that, at a minimum, Grubman... withheld from his readers his serious
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however, have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Reform Act' for
failure to plead with particularity that the research reports in
question misrepresented their authors' true views.'
Statute of Limitations
Defendants have had better luck with motions based on
the statute of limitations.87 These motions argue that in light of
the wealth of information concerning analyst conflicts available
to the public,' securities purchasers should be deemed to have
been on "inquiry notice" of those conflicts - and hence of the
alleged fraud - long before they filed their claims. 9 Merrill
Lynch and its former analyst Blodget won a string of motions

concerns about the accuracy of the WorldCom financial information that he was
conveying to them.").
'5 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)
(2000).
86 See Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153-59
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing case where complaint lacked specific allegations of
statements or conduct by defendant analyst contrary to the opinions expressed in his
research reports); Pfeiffer v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,453,
2003 WL 21505876, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing case where "plaintiffs provide no
facts to show that the Defendants' research analysts actually had a less-optimistic
view" than they expressed in their reports); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports
Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (dismissing case where
complaint alleged that research reports "in many cases" did not reflect analysts' true
opinions but failed to specify underlying facts). See also Pludo v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,541, 2001 WL 958922 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(dismissing case sua sponte, three weeks after it was filed, where 40-page complaint
consisted largely of excerpts from newspaper and magazine articles critical of highprofile Morgan Stanley analyst Meeker: "[a) complaint is not a vehicle in which to air
and put in issue the views of newspapers, magazines, and social engineers, and their
conclusions").
87 Before passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the statute
of limitations for
Rule lob-5 claims was governed by Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, which held that such claims must be filed "within one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or within three years after such
violation." 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991). Section 804(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, effective
July 30, 2001, replaced the one year/three year limitations period decreed by Lampf
with a two year/five year formula. See Public Company Accounting and Investor
Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 804 (b), 116 Stat. 745, 801 (codified in part at
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2000)).
88 See text accompanying notes 28-39.
89 In the Second Circuit, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff
"will be deemed to have
discovered fraud for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations when a reasonable
investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered the existence of fraud." Dodds
v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, when circumstances
would "suggest" to the hypothetical reasonable investor "the probability that she has
been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises, and knowledge will be imputed to the investor
who does not make such an inquiry." Id.
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to dismiss on this ground, all issued by Judge Pollack. ®' For
example, in In- re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports
Securities Litigation, the court dismissed claims brought by
investors in eight different Internet companies covered by
Merrill Lynch, holding:
The plethora of public information would have required even a blind,
deaf or indifferent investor to take notice of the purported alleged
"fraud." Palpably, the plaintiffs, as well as the public regulators and
indeed the whole investment community, were on inquiry notice of
the asserted "fraud," and the alleged conflict of interest, well more
than two years prior to the filing of the Complaints herein. 1

Just before this article went to press, Judge Holwell,
also in the Southern District of New York, used the same logic
to dismiss a class action brought by investors in the brokerage
firm that employed the conflicted analysts. In Shah u. Morgan
Stanley, 2 the court dismissed the case under the two-year
prong of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley statute of limitations, holding
that the lead plaintiff was on "inquiry notice" of the alleged
wrongdoing of Mary Meeker and other Morgan Stanley
analysts no later than May 14, 2001, the date on which Fortune
published a feature article93 revealing, "in no uncertain terms,"
each of the allegedly "undisclosed improper business practices"
described in the complaint."
Other judges in the same district, however, have refused
to dismiss claims against analysts and their employers on
limitations grounds. In Fogarazzo, Judge Scheindlin
distinguished In re Merrill Lynch on the ground that the media
reports cited there "specifically identified Merrill Lynch as
suffering from wide-spread conflicts of interest" and "detailed
particular statements by Merrill Lynch analysts indicating a
massive scheme to defraud," while the defendants in the case
before her presented no comparable materials concerning
90See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F.
Supp. 2d 351, 378-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91 289 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Pfeiffer v. Goldman,
Sachs, 2003 WL 21505876, at *3-4 (dismissing Rule 10b-5 claim governed by preSarbanes-Oxley law on statute of limitations grounds where same plaintiff filed similar
claims in state court over a year before filing his federal case).
9 No. 03 Civ. 8761 (RJH), 2004 WL 2347616 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 19, 2004).
93 Caveat Investor,supra note 35.
2004 WL 2347616, at *10. The court noted that since the plaintiff class in
Shah consisted of investors in Morgan Stanley itself (as opposed to investors in
corporations that happened to be covered by Morgan Stanley's analysts) "this action
presents a more compelling case for holding that the plaintiff had inquiry notice than
other actions in this district with the same holding." Id. at *11.
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Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. 5 And in
DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers, Judge Rakoff ruled that
plaintiffs could not have known that the Lehman Brothers
analyst covering RealNetworks acted with scienter until April
28, 2003, when the SEC released emails showing that the
analyst was advising favored customers to short the stock
while still urging the public to buy it.'
Loss Causation
A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must plead and prove both
transaction causation - that is, that the defendant's conduct
caused her to enter into the detrimental securities transaction
- and loss causation, recently described by the Second Circuit
as a "causal link between the alleged misconduct and the
economic harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff."97 It is
relatively easy to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the
transaction causation element. A plaintiff need only assert that
she relied on the defendant's false or misleading statement to
purchase the stock in question. Easier still, if the case
qualifies for the fraud-on-the-market presumption endorsed by
the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v.Levinson, the plaintiff may
simply allege that she relied on the "integrity of the market,"
and will then be entitled to the presumption that the price of
the stock she bought was affected by all "available material
information" concerning the company, such that any publiclydisseminated misleading statements defrauded her even if she
never read them.'
In a typical Rule 10b-5 case, involving false statements
or material omissions by a company about its business or
financial condition, pleading loss causation is not much more
difficult. This is because the stock price inflation caused by the
misrepresentation is generally cured upon disclosure of the
truth, which is also when the stock price drops and the plaintiff
incurs (or at least realizes) his injury. The situation is
somewhat more complicated, however, in the world of analyst95 2004 WL 1151542, at *18-19 (emphasis by the court).

309 F. Supp. 2d 631, 637 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
97 Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197

(2d Cir. 2003).
95 Id.
485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988). The applicability of the Basic presumption in
analyst conflict cases has not been seriously questioned at the pleading stage, but is
very much in doubt thereafter. See text accompanying notes 118-25.
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conflict litigation. In most such cases, the prices of the stocks at
issue began dropping when the Internet bubble burst in 2000 two years before Merrill Lynch's internal emails were made
public in the Dinallo Affidavit, and three years before similar
materials from other firms were released in connection with
the Global Settlement. Thus, plaintiffs in many of the analystconflict cases are unable to tie the price decline in their
securities to any disclosures concerning the analysts they have
sued."
This peculiarity puts the analyst-conflict cases squarely
in the middle of a debate over loss causation that has split the
circuits and is headed for the Supreme Court. The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have adopted the "purchase price disparity"
approach, which does not require the plaintiff to plead a price
decline upon disclosure of the facts previously misrepresented
or concealed. ' It is enough, as the Ninth Circuit explained in
Broudo, for the plaintiff to allege that the false or misleading
statement inflated the price of the security at the moment the
plaintiff purchased it. '
The Second, Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, on
the other hand, generally require a plaintiff to plead that the
price of the stock declined after purchase and that the decline
was caused, at least in part, by the alleged fraud.' 3 In the view
of these courts, a "purchase-time value disparity, standing
pleading
causation
loss
satisfy the
cannot
alone,
10

Not all analyst-conflict plaintiffs have this difficulty. See, e.g., DeMarco v.
Robertson Stephens, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 590 (GEL) 2004 WL 51232 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the value of their Corvis stock dropped
16% in May 2001, immediately after the New York Times reported a discrepancy
between Robertson Stephens' public "buy" recommendations and private sales of the
same stock by the firm and some of its executives).
10' See Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003); Broudo
v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3451
(U.S. June 28, 2004) (No. 03-932).
102 339 F.3d at 938. The court stated:
[F]or a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that a disclosure and
subsequent drop in the market price of the stock have actually occurred,
because the injury occurs at the time of the transaction. It is at that time that
the damages are to be measured. Thus, loss causation does not require
pleading a stock price drop following a corrective disclosure or otherwise. It
merely requires pleading that the price at the time of the purchase was
overstated and sufficient identification of the cause.
Id.
203 See Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189
(2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000); Bastian v.
Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990); Robbins v. Kroger Properties, Inc., 116
F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997).
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requirement."' Such an allegation "amounts to nothing more
than a paraphrased allegation of transaction causation," which
may explain why the plaintiff bought (or bought at a particular
price), "but not why it lost money on the purchase, the very
question that the loss causation allegation must answer."'"5
Even within the Second Circuit, where most of the
analyst-conflict class actions are venued, district judges have
not applied the price decline approach uniformly. In a pair of
much-quoted opinions relying on Robbins and Emergent
Capital, Judge Pollack dismissed a series of cases filed against
Merrill Lynch on the pleadings, complaining that the plaintiffs
conflated transaction causation and loss causation and that,
because they attempted to allege price inflation only, they
failed to satisfy the latter element." Moreover, according to
Judge Pollack, the Merrill Lynch plaintiffs could not logically
allege that disclosure of the truth about analyst biases caused
the stock price drops that injured them. Those drops, he
pointed out, occurred primarily when the Internet bubble burst
in 2000, whereas the plaintiffs all claimed (for purposes of the
statute of limitations) that they - and hence the market - could
not have known about the analyst conflicts until the Dinallo
Affidavit was released in April 2002. 7
Other judges in the same district have reached different
conclusions. In In re WorldCom, the plaintiffs alleged not only
that Grubman's research reports on WorldCom concealed his
"conflicted position," but also that these reports affirmatively
misrepresented "WorldCom's true financial condition."'
Moreover, plaintiffs alleged, Grubman was not just any analyst
- at the time, he was the industry's leading telecommunication
analyst. Accordingly, revelations concerning his "compromised
relationship" with WorldCom were enough in and of
themselves to affect the company's stock price and even "the

04 Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198.
"45

Id.

See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 4080
(MP), 2004 WL 305809 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research
Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch &
Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 362-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Judge
Pollack also took judicial notice of the crash of the Internet bubble, which he described
as an "intervening cause" of plaintiffs' losses. See In re Merrill Lynch, 289 F. Supp. 2d
at 422; In re MerrillLynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 364-65.
107 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, 289 F. Supp.
2d at 421.
108294 F. Supp. 2d 392,424 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
"06
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economic health of Worldcom itself." 9 On these somewhat
unusual facts, Judge Cote denied defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged that "the
subsequent disclosure of accurate information about these two
issues [Grubman's conflicts and WorldCom's financial position]
caused the price of WorldCom's securities to drop.""'°
In DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers, Judge Rakoff applied a
substantially more lenient legal standard to find plaintiffs' loss
causation allegations adequate."' Insofar as can be discerned
from the opinion, the analyst in that case, Michael Stanek, was
not accused of misrepresenting RealNetworks' finances but
merely of misrepresenting his own opinion."' Moreover, unlike
the In re WorldCom plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in DeMarco did not
allege that Stanek was such a force in the industry that
revelations concerning his biases would be sufficient to move
the market."' Nonetheless, Judge Rakoff denied Lehman
Brothers' motion to dismiss on loss causation grounds, noting
that the price of the stock declined when "the market was
finally apprised of the negative information concerning
RealNetworks that had earlier led Stanek to take a secretly
negative view of the stock."".4 Although this standard does
require the plaintiffs to plead a price decline, and does require
that the decline be linked in some way to the challenged
research report, Judge Rakoffs logic would seem to obliterate
the distinction that Emergent Capital was at such pains to
draw. Under the DeMarco rule, analyst conflict cases would go
forward even where the stock drop has nothing to do with the
disclosure of the truth about the analyst (as opposed to the
truth about the company).
The difficulty in applying the price decline approach to
loss causation in the analyst conflict context is perhaps best
illustrated by Fogarazzo v. Lehman Brothers, where the
plaintiffs alleged that defendants' bullish research reports on
RSL Communications misstated the authors' true opinions and
inflated RSL stock."' Judge Scheindlin carefully reviewed
recent Second Circuit case law and held, consistently with
9 Id. at 405, 428.
110Id. at 428.
"'.
11

309 F. Supp. 2d 631, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Id. at 634-35.

113 Id.

11'Id. at 636-37.
1152004 WL 1151542, at *7.
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Emergent Capital,that in such a case the stock decline must be
"attributable to the very thing that the defendants allegedly
lied about...6 She then held that the plaintiffs satisfied the
Second Circuit's loss causation test by alleging that RSL failed
"because of the very facts that [defendants] misrepresented:
that RSL was in financial difficulty and that the entire
"internet telephony' sector was collapsing.""7
But a closer look at the opinion reveals that defendants
did not in fact lie about RSL's finances, or at least did not do so
by "withhold[ing] information about RSL's debts or assets or
about any important financial events in the life of RSL" (all of
which were "available for the world to see")."8 Instead, the
defendants in Fogarazzo, as in many of the analyst conflict
cases, were alleged simply to have "misstate[d] [their] true
opinions of the impact of these events." "' In order to squeeze
this fact pattern through the loss causation door, the court
simply recharacterized the allegations of the complaint,
transforming lies about defendants' opinions - the disclosure of
which, standing alone, is not alleged to have caused any drop in
RSL's stock price - into lies about RSL's finances. The court's
conclusion is not only inconsistent with the underlying factual
allegations from which it is drawn, it threatens to wreak havoc
with the basic notion that Rule 10b-5 requires a
misrepresentation (or omission) of fact."'
Fraudon the Market
As noted above, since the court is required to accept as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, the
applicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to a class
action based on analyst conflict allegations has not been
seriously challenged at the pleading stage."' But the real utility
of the doctrine to a class action plaintiff comes at the class
certification stage, because, absent a blanket presumption of
reliance, each class member would be required to prove that he
or she personally relied on the defendant's alleged
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misrepresentations, which in turn would make class
certification impossible. '
In In re WorldCom Securities Litigation, Judge Cote
granted the plaintiffs' class certification motion, holding with
respect to the analyst conflict claims that there is no reason not
to apply the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to research reports. '
However, the Second Circuit promptly granted the brokerage
firm defendants' motion, made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f),
to hear a discretionary interlocutory appeal from the district
court's class certification order.2 4 And while the appellate court
has not yet decided the merits of that appeal, its initial opinion
suggests that it is likely to focus on issues of evidence and
burden of proof.125
Most recently, in a carefully-worded opinion written in
anticipation of close appellate scrutiny, Judge Rakoff focused
on the same issues and held:
[Tihe fraud-on-the-market doctrine may in certain conditions apply
to analyst reports but ... the plaintiffs here have failed to adduce
to satisfy such conditions for purposes of class
evidence adequate
12
certification. 1

Reviewing the familiar logic underlying Basic, Judge
Rakoff had no difficulty accepting the premise that "some
research analysts may have the ability to influence market
prices on the basis of their recommendations."27 He was quick,
however, to distinguish the potential impact of a fraudulent
statement made by an issuer and a statement of opinion
emanating from a research analyst, holding that in the latter
case no "automatic impact on the price of a security can be
presumed and instead must be proven and measured before the
statement can be said to have 'defrauded the market' in any
material way that is not simply speculative."2 Turning to the
evidence adduced by the parties in DeMarco, Judge Rakoff
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3), 23(b)(3).
219 F.R.D. 267, 299 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003).
114 Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004).
1 See id. at 78 (noting that the district judge expressly declined to "'wade
into the battle of the experts' as to the existence of a causal link between Grubman's
analyst reports and movements in the price of WorldCom's securities; instead, Judge
Cote credited the plaintiffs' allegations that Grubman's statements of opinion changed
the prices of WorldCom's securities").
126 DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 2004 WL 1506242,
at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2004).
127 Id. at *2.
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112
123

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

found the plaintiffs' expert testimony so flawed that it did not
"remotely satisfy the aforementioned burden," and denied the
motion."
THE NEXT PHASE

Both the plaintiffs and the defendants in the analystconflict cases now winding their way through the lower federal
courts are keeping a close eye on both the Second Circuit,
which is presiding over appeals from the Merrill Lynch cases
and In re WorldCom, and the Supreme Court, which is
expected to rule in Broudo some time next year. If the Supreme
Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit and endorses the purchase
price disparity approach to loss causation, the pleading burden
for analyst-conflict plaintiffs now struggling in the Second
Circuit will be greatly lightened. If, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court rejects the Ninth Circuit rule in favor of a price
decline test like that now used in the Second Circuit, it will
become more difficult for analyst-conflict plaintiffs throughout
the country to survive the defendants' inevitable pleading
motions.
Within the Second Circuit, the preliminary opinion in
Hevesi suggests that the appellate court may have its greatest
impact on the pending analyst-conflict litigation by ruling, in a
non-pleading context, on the fraud-on-the-market issue. If the
Second Circuit requires proof of a causal link between the
analyst's reports and price movement in the covered stock at
the class certification stage, such motions may become far more
significant events in an analyst conflict case than they typically
are in other securities fraud class actions. Most obviously, in
many cases (particularly those involving less prominent
analysts or crowded fields), defendants will stand a decent
chance of preventing certification altogether, which would
effectively end the litigation. Moreover, the motion proceedings
themselves will require that the plaintiffs preview their
damages evidence and that the court evaluate it."3° Where the
'9
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The plaintiffs in DeMarco "now disclaim even an attempt to prove that the

publication of Stanek's 'buy' recommendations.., increased the price of RealNetworks'
stock." 2004 WL 1506242, at *4. Instead, plaintiffs tried (and failed) to show that a
.sell" recommendation would have lowered the price of the stock. Id. While the two
inquiries are closely related, they are not the same. And as a matter of logic it is the
former question - whether defendants' alleged misconduct inflated the price of the
stock that the plaintiff bought - that should be addressed in the context of a class
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court finds that evidence weak, the plaintiffs may survive the
class certification motion but find that their case has a
considerably lower settlement value as a result.

certification motion turning on the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.
After all, the function of that doctrine is to supply (or substitute for) the reliance
element of a Rule 10b-5 claim, also known as transaction causation. See Emergent
Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003). When
and if plaintiffs in analyst conflict cases are required to establish that defendants'
positive recommendations inflated the price of the stocks they covered, they will come
face to face with the empirical studies showing that "the market" distrusted, and
therefore discounted, recommendations from the same underwriter-affiliated analysts
who are now the class action defendants. See Michaely & Womack, supra note 37, at
668-69.

